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Australia-US Alliance and Strategic 
Geometry in the Indo-Pacific Region:  





The 21st Century is witnessing a significant change in the 
strategic landscape. The US hegemonic power that 
provided the stability for almost seven decades is in 
relative decline. Over the past decade, amidst the 
receding hegemonic status of the US, nation states, and 
especially the rising powers, are reformulating their 
foreign policy to reposition themselves in the strategic 
transformation by enhancing their defence capabilities, 
asserting militarily and forming countervailing alliances.  
Countries such as China, Russia, France and Germany, 
have challenged U.S. unilateralism in the United Nations 
and other forums such as NATO, whenever their interests 
have not converged with the United States. This receding 
trend of hegemonic influence is visible in the Kosovo 
crisis, Iraq war, and recently in the Ukrainian and Syrian 
crisis.   
Keywords: US-Australia relations, Indo-Pacific region, strategic 
relations, Defence White Papers, FONOPS 
 
                                                          
*  Adjunct Faculty, The University of New South Wales, Canberra,  
Australian Defence Force Academy,  and  Deputy Chair, New Zealand 
Institute of International Affairs, Auckland;  dr.akssharma@gmail.com 
 





The era of western ascendancy since 1750 and of US ascendancy 
since 1945, known as Pax Americana, is coming to an end. By 2030 
Asia will be bigger in economic size and strategic weight than 
Europe and the United States combined, but the United States will 
remain the first among equals, with the EU, China, India and Japan 
as the leading contenders to be counted among the equals.  Asia‘s 
emergence as the fastest growing economic region and changing 
geopolitics, driven by the re-emergence of China and of India as 
major nodes of global activity, and the relative U.S. decline from 
dominance have given rise to new strategic alliances between the 
region‘s major players. Australia too is repositioning itself in this 
shifting global order (Thakur 2013; NIC 2012).   
However, the challenge to the US hegemonic power is most visible 
in the Indo-Pacific /Asia-Pacific region (Indo-Pacific and Asia-
Pacific are used here interchangeable for the same geo-political 
region) where the emerging and re-emerging great powers are 
expanding their sphere of influence. On the one hand, the stability 
provided by U.S. pre-eminence in the Asia-Pacific region is being 
challenged by the economically powerful and militarily assertive 
China; on the other hand the rising economic and military profile of 
India and Japan is witnessing a new set of strategic alliances and 
partnerships to maintain the stability in the region.   
Amidst the uncertain strategic scenario at the global and regional 
level, Australia is today faced with challenge of uncertainty about 
the US pre-eminence and commitment to the Asia-Pacific region 
amidst the alarming rate of the Chinese military assertiveness and 
North Korean display of its nuclear and missile capability to 
threaten the US and its allies with a possible nuclear attack. The 
US-China competitive relationship and the trade flows through the 
Asia-Pacific region are bringing new strategic challenge for 
Australia. 
What emerges from the above is an assessment of Australia‘s 
alliance with the United States in the Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific 
region. The article scans the ongoing debate in Australia on the 
continuation of the Australia-US security alliance amidst the 
emerging strategic geometry in the Asia-Pacific region. To capture 
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the debate this article uses the periodic Australian Government 
documents which have been released in the form of Defence White 
Papers (DWP) and National Security Papers, and the recent 
arguments in the Australian political circle. The article observes 
that to pursue Australia‘s national interest is increasingly becoming 
difficult given the competitive geostrategic environment in the 
Indo-Pacific region.  Despite the opposing voices to reassess 
Australia‘s relationship with the US, the alliance will remain 
significant for Australia‘s security interest. Australia‘s alliance with 
the United States that has been tested by time and marked by the 
mutual confidence and trust, coordination and interoperability. The 
relationship is deeply enrooted in the values and principles of 
democracy, and grounded in the geostrategic realities.     
 Divided into five sections, the article deals with the traditional ties 
between Australia and the US; debates surrounding Australia‘s 
alliance with the US; Trump‘s flip flop policy on containing China‘s 
growing military build-up; Chinese Growing Assertiveness in the 
Asia-Pacific region and tensions on competing claims over the 
South China Sea; and Australia-US alliance is inevitability amidst 
the strategic realities; and a conclusion.   
Traditional Bonhomie: Australia-US Security Alliance  
Historically, Australia and the United States have shared a strong 
security alliance, formally cemented in 1951 under the Australia, 
New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). Since then, 
Australia has joined the U.S. military efforts when necessary. The 
U.S.-Australia security alliance continues to enjoy domestic support 
both in Washington and in Canberra – contributing to the 
prolonged economic and security partnership between the two 
countries (Sharma 2016). Over a period of time, both the nations‘ 
armed forces have developed mutual confidence and 
interoperability.  
Australia‘s alliance with the United States has survived for a long 
time. Australia‘s endorsement and acceptance of its alliance with 
the US is manifested in various Australian Government documents, 
including Australia‘s Defence White Papers. Australians have 
normally assumed that their defence entails the domination of the 




Western Pacific by an Anglo-Saxon maritime power and have 
given priority to supporting their ally‘s primacy.  
But over the past decade, the concern about the uncertain strategic 
scenario because of the economic rise of China and its assertive 
military posture, and the improbability on sustainability of the US 
hegemonic power in ensuring the stability in Asia-Pacific region 
have figured prominently in the Australian foreign policy debate. 
The 2009 DWP, developed in the midst of the global recession, 
recognised the unfolding security structures of the wider Asia–
Pacific region and the need for a firm geo-strategic stand in its 
neighbourhood region in terms of the force structure drivers. DWP 
notes that since the beginning of the 21st Century, the biggest 
transformation has been the rise of China, the emergence of India 
and the receding trend in the pre-eminence of the United States as 
the hegemon in the so-called unipolar moment for almost two-
decade-long period in which the superiority of Australia‘s main 
ally was unchallenged. Though it acknowledges the emergence of 
other great powers-―China, India, Russia, Japan and the European 
Union‖, the DWP envisions that the US will remain the most 
powerful and influential strategic actor over the period to 2030 - 
politically, economically and militarily. Its strategic primacy will 
assist in the maintenance of a stable global strategic environment. 
At the same time, it states China‘s strategic posture as ambivalent 
(DWP 2009, 30-32).  
In the 2012 White Paper (WP), Prime Minister Julia Gillard 
acknowledged that Australia‘s geography is its destiny: ―The Asian 
century is an Australian opportunity‖ (WP, 2012). The 2012 WP 
titled ―Australia in the Asian Century‖ foresees Australia as 
promoting cooperative arrangements among nations in the region 
as the economic and strategic landscape shifts.  The DWP supports 
China‘s participation in the region‘s strategic, political, and 
economic development. It talks about the importance of an 
emerging strategic scenario because of the rise of China and the 
resulting impact on its regional and global interests, as well as 
those of its neighbours; India‘s increasing re-engagement in East 
Asia; and the United States Re-Balancing Act in the Asia-pacific 
region. The DWP supports the continuation of Australia‘s alliance 
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with the United States, and its powerful and consistent presence in 
the region for its resulting stability, security and peace (WP, 2012).  
The 2012 DWP viewpoint is essentially echoed in the national 
security outlook in the ―2013 Strong and Secure: A Strategy for 
Australia‘s National Security‖. Protecting Australia‘s border 
integrity, deterring attacks on Australia, and protecting and 
promoting Australia‘s interests in a secured international 
environment; the document places emphasis on the trilateral 
security alliance of Australia, the US, and Japan and the Australia–
United States Alliance (Australian Government, 2013). The 2016 
DWP presents a strong strategic argument for Australia‘s future 
defence based on seizing opportunities while managing strategic 
challenges. Significant emphasis is on the Australian Government‘s 
strategy to continue to strengthen its alliance with the United States 
(DWP, 2016).  
Almost all the Australian DWPs emphasise the significance of 
Australia-US alliance which has been strongly backed by the 
Australian Government. The astounding scale and pace of change, 
led by the growing economic weight which is translating into 
strategic weight, is transformative for the world and the Asia-
pacific region. This is gradually posing challenge to Australia‘s 
strategic posture in an intense and competitive geostrategic 
environment.    
Debating Australia’s Alliance with the US   
Since the 1970s, China‘s massive push towards modernisation, 
urbanisation, manufacturing, and infrastructure development 
produced a demand for resources, energy, and raw materials. 
Australia was well placed to meet a lot of this demand, and it was a 
ready market for Chinese manufactured goods (Holmes, 2013). As 
a result, China became Australia‘s largest trading partner in the late 
2007, and in 2009 Australia's largest export market with more than 
$150 bilateral trade (Australian Embassy in China). The Australia-
China economic bonhomie will continue to expand. However, the 
Chinese military build-up is creating uneasiness for the historically-
resilient Australia-U.S. security alliance. The evolving strategic 
geometry in the Asia-Pacific region can potentially affect Australia 
more than any other security problem in the world. Australia is 




faced with the challenge of maintaining its economic ties with 
China and its security alliance with the United States. Despite the 
growing significance of the Asia-Pacific region, Australian policy-
makers had not to face the challenge of choosing between its 
military and economic partner, or between European history and 
Asian topography. This has continued for a long time. Even during 
the era of Prime Minister John Howard (1996–2007), the dominant 
intonation was that Australia did not have to choose between 
European history and Asian geography.  
Over the past decade, the Australian foreign and security policy 
debate has revolved around Australia‘s alliance with the United 
States. The questions have been raised regarding the continuity of 
the Australia-US security alliance. The clamour for a more 
independent foreign policy has come from the influential voices in 
the past. This includes the former opposition leader John Hewson, 
who demands an immediate parliamentary debate on future 
diplomatic and military strategic choices to pursue Australia‘s 
national interest in the current security threat environment (Malone 
2017). The most vocal opponent of the alliance is the former 
Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Frazer, who advocates for a re-
evaluation of Australia's commitment to the US alliance. In his 
book Dangerous Allies, published in 2014, Frazer questions the 
continuity of the alliance, as the Australian economic interest lies 
with China and the broader Asia Pacific region. He points to the 
cost that Australia is paying for the alliance. He argues that, as a 
part of an American network, Australia is a compliant partner and 
a strategic captive of the US, and considered merely as a surrogate 
voice of America and therefore exerts no true influence (Frazer). 
His views were summarised by former Labor foreign minister 
Gareth Evans as "the only aggression for which we are likely to 
need American defence will be that prompted by the alliance itself‖ 
(Malone, 2017).  The critics of Australia-US ties see the alliance as 
undermining Australia‘s weight in Asia. 
Paul Keating, the former Prime Minister from the Labour Party, 
urges a reconsideration of Australia‘s alliance with US, and 
cautions Australia on getting into a confrontational situation in the 
evolving strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing. Unlike 
Fraser‘s extreme position of outright rejection of alliance and 
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cutting off ties with the US in total to avoid Australia‘s 
involvement in the war, Keating takes a more moderate view and 
urges the Australian government to make efforts to shape the 
outcome of US-Sino rivalry to avoid war.  
However, these individuals who are challenging the sanctity of 
Australia‘s relationship with the United States are no longer in 
power or serving in the government. They are not responsible for 
their words or actions. It is easy for former leaders to question 
Australia‘s relationship with the US. Their critics say that this is 
partly because staffs are rewarded for backing the alliance, and 
those opposing the alliance get no promotion and no attractive 
postings in the departments.   
Recently the debate has been focused on whether Australia should 
join the US-led Freedom of Navigation Operation Program 
(FONOP) in the South China Sea. The strongest advocacy for the 
joining of the US-led efforts to stop Chinese expansion has come 
from the former Prime Minister John Howard. Expressing his 
concern on China‘s unabated expansionism and violation of the 
international rules-based order, Howard said ―I think this country 
should be ready at some point, if circumstances are appropriate, 
and that would be a matter of judgment of the government at the 
time, to be involved in freedom-of-navigation operations. I think 
we should be willing to be part of that. I can‘t think of any 
alternative to it‖ (Riordan, 2017).  Australian defence experts are 
divided over the merits of Australian involvement. Former Defence 
Force Chief, Sir Angus Houston, has said it would not be a good 
idea as it would provoke a military response, while former Defence 
Department head Dennis Richardson said it could be a good idea if 
done in a non-provocative way. Currently, in the Coalition 
Government some including Tony Abbott, Kevin Andrews and 
Eric Abetz have advocated for confronting China (Riordan, 2017). 
But the Turnbull Government is hesitant as reflected in Foreign 
Minister Julie Bishop‘s statement that Australia is yet to commit to 
sailing that close to the islands, which would escalate tensions. The 
poor handling of Australia‘s positioning in the US-China 
competition may threaten to drive a wedge between the United 
States and Australia, and potentially undermine Australian security 
and its foreign policy (Fontaine, 2016). 




The receding hegemonic influence of the US over the past decade, 
and more recently, the uncertainty of the US President Donald 
Trump‘s flip-flop policy on the Chinese militarily assertive posture 
in the South China Sea have flared the debate and   question the US 
as reliable security provider in the region. The allies are finding it 
hard to reconcile their national interests with that of ‗America First 
and American Interests‘ under Trump presidency. Critics point out 
that Australia is being seen as Trump's man in the Asia Pacific 
which enhances Australia‘s security threat and makes it vulnerable 
to the countries in the region, which are adverse to the US.  
Trump’s Wavering Policy on China’s Military Build-up  
Trump‘s initial tough talk on the Chinese aggression, both on the 
economic and military fronts, is now being seen as mellowed 
down. Trump‘s inaction on his promise to impose a 45 per cent 
tariff on Chinese imports, and the Pentagon‘s decision to turn 
down Pacific Command's request for US warship patrols in China's 
proclaimed territorial waters are testimony this concern. 
Apparently wary of angering Beijing, the US decision to suspend 
patrols of islands and reefs claimed by China (Malone, 2017). The 
US allies also have expectations from the US for leadership on a 
range of demanding political issues. But Trump‘s erratic stand on 
the countering Chinese aggression in the South China Sea is 
becoming concerning for the China wary countries which 
depended on the US as a security provider in the region. The 
renewed North Korean nuclear and missile developments have 
further deviated Trump. The US inability to look beyond North 
Korea is further questioning the credentials of the US as a 
formidable power for the maintenance of stability in the region. 
Trump‘s demand from South Korea, an ally for the six decades, for 
the payment to an antimissile system built by the US to deter North 
Korea has not gone well with Moon Jae-in, the new president who 
is pursuing a more appeasing approach with the North Korea. This 
is likely to further create a drift in the US-South Korea relations 
(Hernandez, 2017). The US policy of imposing tough sanctions has 
not been able to stop the North Korean nuclear and missile 
programme.  
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In other parts of Asia-Pacific region, including the Philippines, 
Taiwan and Vietnam, Trump‘s policy has created an unease as they 
are worried that Trump might ease the US counter-balancing 
strategy to deter China in the region. The delay of arms sale to 
Taiwan by the US is further being seen as conciliatory stand on 
Chinese aggression. The Philippines is worried about the United 
States‘ wavering approach to challenge China in the South China 
Sea (Hernandez, 2017). The United States‘ inability to put a strong 
resistance to counter China may create a situation in which the 
countries may look for the option of mending their ties with China 
and move closer to China (Hernandez, 2017).  
On the economic front too, Trump‘s abhorrence for multilateralism 
and the US withdrawal from Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade pact 
that was expected to have significant benefits for Southeast Asia, 
further questioned the US commitment to the Asia-Pacific nations. 
To fill the void and lure the Asia-Pacific nations, China has 
proposed to double down its investment in the region.    
President Trump‘s delay in settling in the office, the US 
involvement in the Syrian crisis, and the latest of North Korea‘s 
renewed nuclear and missile activity has diverted US attention 
from the South China Sea and has given ample space for China to 
manoeuvre its strategic move in the disputed Sea.  
Though many analysts view Trump‘s thinking and style of 
working as different and believe it‘s not what it seems, Trump‘s 
supporters point out that the US President is aware of these 
problems and concerns of its allies. But the pressing demand is the 
North Korean aggressive nuclear posture and belligerent approach 
towards the US. His impulsive style and willingness to volte-face 
decades of accepted policy may be strength, particularly in tackling 
a stubborn leader like Kim Jong-un of North Korea. But his lack of 
reassurances to Asian allies and his ease towards China have given 
the impression that Trump‘s external policy is crossable.  
But there has been tough posture form the Trump administration 
as well. Starting from his election campaign to the statement by the 
US Secretary of State there has been an indication that the US action 
will be tough. The US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson statement 
suggesting that China should be denied access to the islands it 




built, the Trump administration‘s response has been strong 
(Forsythe, 2017). Trump‘s moderate posture on China further gets 
diluted after his maiden speech at the UN in which he threatened 
to totally destroy North Korea if it develops nuclear weapon (ABC, 
2017). Trump had threatened that the U.S. might end trade with 
countries that do business with North Korea after Pyongyang‘s 
sixth and most powerful nuclear test which it claims was a 
Hydrogen Bomb. This also set the stage for a possible standoff 
between the US and China.  
Earlier, Trump‘s moderate posture on China was seen from the 
security threat that immediately needed the American President‘s 
attention. Consequently, the South China Sea was relegated to the 
backstage because of North Korea‘s missile tests and nuclear-
weapons development.  Trump was hoping form China a tougher 
pressure on North Korea on its nuclear and missile programme, 
and saw more value in winning China's support for his campaign 
to confront North Korea over its nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missile programs.    
Chinese Growing Assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific Region: 
Tensions on Competing Claims over the South China Sea    
China economic rise has enabled it to strengthen its military build- 
up and a greater strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In 
recent years, China has taken steps toward a greater control over 
the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean by enhancing its naval 
capabilities, militarizing islands in the South China Sea, and 
building the artificial islands and port facilities in the Island nations 
to mark its presence in the region. To reinforce its claim over the 
South China Sea, China has erected around 250 islands. The 
intensity of Chinese military assertiveness in the South China Sea 
has made it a zone of competing claims. China claims the right to it 
by pointing to historical maps that prove its ownership of almost 
the entire sea. But the Chinese claim is disputed by competing 
claims of the countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, 
Brunei, and Vietnam. The South China Sea, a huge stretch of 
waterways, is rich in oil and gas resources, and more than $5 
trillion dollars‘ worth of international trade is shipped through it 
every year.  
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China defends its actions in the South China Sea on historical, 
economic, and security grounds (Coonan, 2016). But, this does not 
mitigate the wariness of surrounding nations in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The Chinese assertion in the South China Sea has been 
meted out with a strong reaction by the previous US administration 
under President Obama. The US has responded to the Chinese 
claim over the South China Sea through its FONOPS. In 1979, the 
FONOP was started by the US government to contest unilateral 
acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedom of 
the international community. The programme includes both 
manoeuvres aimed exclusively to challenge maritime claims that 
the U.S. considers excessive, and operations with other purposes 
that incidentally challenge territorial claims. The recent freedom of 
navigation exercise began after the Chinese activities in the South 
China Sea were taken to the international court by the Philippines 
Government in 2013 (USNI, 2017). Since October 2015, the US has 
been doing the freedom of navigation drill udder the 
incontrovertible norm of freedom of navigation in international 
seas, as mentioned in the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS). In January 2016, the U.S. missile destroyer USS 
Curtis Wilbur sailed within 22km of Triton Island in the Paracel 
chain announced in order to challenge the excessive maritime 
claims by China and other claiming nations in the South China Sea 
(SBS, 2016). On 10 May 2016, the USS William Lawrence (DDG-110) 
sailed within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef (Harvard 
Kennedy School), a contested artificial island in the Spratly Island 
chain. 
China is also critical of the US naval operations in the South China 
Sea. Beijing contests the UN pronouncement and challenges the 
FONOPS as the US-led strategic move to maintain its strategic 
primacy and to contain China. The US asserts that it has the right 
and it will continue its FONOPS drill throughout the world to 
maintain free navigation principle without meddling by any other 
country. 
The US freedom of navigation is open to the regional allies. 
Australia is faced with the challenge of positioning itself in the 
tussle between the US and China. These two big economies have 
been at odds over the past three years over the status of Chinese 




artificial islands in the South China Sea and U.S. Freedom of 
Navigation Operations.  
On 24 May 2017, Under Trump‘s Presidency, the first US FONOP 
took place in which the US sent the guided-missile destroyer USS 
Dewey to sail through disputed sea, sailing close to Mischief Reef. 
This also was the first military maritime exercise under Trump 
presidency (Perlez, 2017). The US asserts that the freedom of 
navigation means free access to both the exclusive economic zones 
(EEZ) and territorial seas without permission from the relevant 
coastal state. But, China is against the military vessels entering a 
coastal state‘s territorial seas without official permission. Beijing 
also claims that military ships in EEZ territorial waters are 
unlawful and suspicious, and only non-military vessels enjoy the 
right to passage.  For the US, ensuring the freedom of navigation 
throughout Asia-Pacific region is a national prerogative and a 
matter of vital importance. As such, China – specifically, its 
military activities on some of the disputed South China Sea islands 
– is clearly its main obstacle. So far, no other nations have joined 
the US FONOPS, and the confrontations have been avoided. But 
the trend shows that this status quo may not last. According to the 
Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International 
Studies report: China has completed the major construction work 
of military infrastructure on artificial islands in the South China Sea 
and in a position to now set up fighter aircrafts, military assets and 
missile launchers (Reuters, 2017). Across the region, the nations are 
concerned about Chinese military incursion and their hope of 
seeing more American military troops in the region to combat 
China has not been met. China‘s building projects continued 
unabated. China is entering in the space created by recent US 
inaction in the Indo-Pacific region.  
Trump has spoken in recent days with leaders of the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand, inviting each to the White House. 
Tillerson has tried to reassure allies that freedom-of-navigation 
patrols will continue. Trump‘s move to de-emphasize human rights 
concerns with countries like Thailand and the Philippines could be 
seen as building bulwark against China, and an obvious move to 
restrain these countries from falling into China‘s palm (Hernandez, 
2017).  The early goodwill between US President Donald Trump 
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and China‘s Xi Jinping has dissipated as differences re-emerge over 
North Korea, the South China Sea, Taiwan and trade (Dupont, 
2017). The security threat is not far for Australia as the long peace is 
giving way to an intense security and strategic competition 
between the major powers. Where the US remains the dominant 
player and the US will have no option but to confront China 
diplomatically, or militarily. Australia has been avoiding the free 
navigation drill in joining the US-led military exercises in the Asia-
pacific region. Australia will have no choice but to take a stand and 
choose between the US and China if that happens.     
Australia-US Alliance is Indispensable: The Strategic Realities   
Critics point towards the blunder decision made by the US in 
Vietnam War and the Second Iraq War, and Australia‘s willingness 
to follow the US in every major war since the inception of its 
alliance with the US. But, even the closest allies can come to 
different conclusions. Britain opted out of Washington‘s Vietnam 
misadventure, yet their relationship survived and thrived. The 
alliance with the superpower is an asset for Australia to manage in 
its national interest. This is a peculiarly unwise moment for 
Australia to discard a major ally. The Philippines broke off its 
alliance ―The U.S.-Philippines defense agreements‖ signed in 
1952 in 1992, but in 2014 it signed an agreement to allow the US 
more freedom to operate in its territory (Albert, 2016). Even the 
great powers, such as Japan, are today reaching to the US for 
reassurance in the face of Chinese force. No Australians want to see 
their country in a mindless alliance with America. But the alliance 
is an advantage for Australia to draw on judiciously, to be neither 
followed obsequiously nor discarded rashly (Hartcher, 2014).  
Though China promotes itself as a new, gentler kind of power, but 
it‘s worth remembering that dredging deep water ports and laying 
down railroad ties to secure new trade routes — and then having to 
defend them from angry locals — was precisely how Britain started 
down the slippery slope to empire (Larmer, 2017). China‘s military 
build-up is challenging the international system and rule-based 
order in the Asia-Pacific region. This development is a concern for 
the all the likeminded democratic nations in the region. The 
diffusion of liberal economic order, fair play of economic activities, 




and free navigation of good and trade activities are being 
threatened. In recent years, the South China Sea build-up could be 
seen in China‘s unprecedented scale of land reclamation, 
construction of island airstrips, piers, and surveillance 
structures and naval modernization has expanded its ability to 
project power.   
Despite all the mixed response from the Trump administration, the 
official statements are clear that the US would not budge down 
against China and the US Asia-Pacific policy would involve the 
burden to be shared its allies as well. Australia has been supportive 
of most the US- led military operation in the Middle East and the 
Af-Pak region, but the Australia-US security alliance will be tested 
in the Asia-Pacific region.   
The United States is already having strong strategic and defence 
alliances in the region with Australia, Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand (Brookings 
2016). The US Rebalancing Act has continued under Trump 
administration and more frequent exercises with likeminded 
democratic nations in all probability is going to remain a pillar of 
U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region. These alliances are 
the bedrock of U.S. foreign policy in the region.  
The US is paramount to Australia‘s security and will continue to be 
a deterring force   for prospective adversary and aggressor of 
Australia. The Australia-US defence ties – commerce, transfer of 
superior technologies, joint military exercises, joint training and 
intelligence sharing - have resulted into high level of 
interoperability and mutual confidence between the armed forces 
of the both the countries.  In addition, Australia‘s alliance with the 
world‘s leading great power provides Australia diplomatic weight 
in the world.   
Despite Australia‘s economic bonhomie with China, there is 
divergence between the democratic Australia and an 
increasingly authoritarian China. The two nations don‘t go together 
on the political values and principles. The development in China in 
the recent years has become more authoritarian and illiberal, 
reversing the previous trend towards greater pluralism. Not only 
China‘s stand on the South China Sea and North Korea but there is 
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also a growing concern about the Chinese espionage and cyber-
theft of Australian intellectual property, the revelations of Chinese 
influence-buying in Australia and the well-documented pressure 
on Chinese students and the local Chinese language press to toe 
Beijing‘s line have further added to already not so favourable 
public perception about China in Australia. This is unlike the 
enduring US-Australia security alliance which is based on shared 
values and interests.   
On the economic front, at first glance one may find that China is 
ahead of the US as indispensable partner. But argument on the 
basis of overall trade statistics contradicts this notion. The 
Australia-US alliance is deep rooted in the similar free liberal and 
fair economic system. The number shows that Australia-US 
relationship on this front too is indispensable and the two-way 
trade goes beyond many would think. Most Australians view 
China as Australia‘s most important economic partner. In 2015, 
Australia- China annual bilateral trade was around $150 billion, 
almost double the Australia-US annual bilateral of $70 billion.   
This is reflected in Australian foreign minister Julia Bishop 
repeated reference to the US as ―Australia's most important 
economic partner‖. Trade is only one component of a broader 
economic picture. Cumulatively, two-way investment between the 
US and Australia totals $1.45 trillion, dwarfing Australia's other 
bilateral economic relationships (Holden, Jackman & Mondschein, 
2017). The Australia-US economic relationship is profoundly 
enrooted in the liberal and market-based values. Secure property 
rights and procedural fairness – backed by the rule of law and 
democratic political institutions in both countries – mean that 
Australia's economic relationship with the US spans access to 
capital, technological diffusion, and knowledge transfers. In each of 
these domains, the United States overshadows China, and remains 
Australia's most important economic partner. The US investments, 
knowledge transfers and technology have helped fuel Australia's 
trade surpluses with Asia. Though China too has become an 
integral economic partner of Australia, but Australia-US economic 
relationship is dynamic and remains a strong pillar for the 
prosperity of Australia (Holden, Jackman & Mondschein, 2017) 
Additionally, Australia‘s security alliance with the US reduces not 




only the degree of threat facing Australia but also the defence 
spending that would otherwise be required to deal with it (DOD, 
2015). 
Australia is also faced with the challenge of the low-level instability 
in its neighbourhood, and the impact of fragile states in Indo-
Pacific region, and the Islamic extremism leading to possible terror 
attacks because of the instability in the Middle East and South Asia. 
This will continue to pose security challenges to Australia directly 
or indirectly. These security threats will require international 
cooperation where Australia will need more and more 
international collaboration to tackle the conflicts and thwart the 
possible terror attacks.  In this context too the Australia-US alliance 
is indispensable.   
Conclusion 
China‘s rise is an inevitable phenomenon of this century.  The 
Chinese militarily assertive posture is also leading to the formation 
of strategic alliances and partnerships to not let China dominate the 
region.  Australia would certainly look for a situation in which it 
has not to pick between the US and China. The best strategy to 
pursue its interests for Australia would be to increase its 
engagement with other powers in the region. There are many 
developments that are being seen in this context.  
One is the emergence of Indo-Pacific region which is the new 
terminology for the Asia-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific is a super-
region bound by the sea-lanes of communication that carry oil 
across the Indian Ocean, through the South China Sea and into the 
Pacific, but also by the ASEAN-centred regional security 
architecture that has emerged since the 1990s, particularly the East 
Asia Summit. As such, the concept captures a set of emerging 
challenges and opportunities to which Australia must respond 
(Medcalf, 2016). Additionally, the Indo-Pacific term acknowledges 
the arrival of India and its economic and strategic significance in 
the context of balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. 
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The trajectory shows that India is all set to one of the top three 
economic and military powers with a considerable influence in the 
world and particularly in the Asia-Pacific region in the coming 
decades. India‘s ―Look East Policy‖ started in 1990s is now being 
pursued under the ―Act East Policy‖ by the present Modi 
Government‘s multi-alignment policy (Hall, 2016). Some of the 
major developments in this regards have been India‘s engagement 
with Japan, Vietnam, and other China wary countries. It‘s not only 
cultural and economic relations that is being emphasised but its 
security and defence as well. India‘s deepening comprehensive 
relationship with the United States of which the growing defence 
and security relationship is a major component, is being pitched as 
the defining partnership of the 21st Century with a considerable 
impact on the balance of power in the 21st century (Sharma 2017).  
The Quadrilateral Initiative (Quad), a maritime security agreement 
between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India (Sharma, 
2010), joined by Australia under the Howard Government and then 
withdrawal under Rudd Government after Australia weighed the 
option of remaining in the alliance, while running the risk of 
severing its economic ties with China.  However, the idea behind 
the Quad has resurfaced (Medcalf, 2016), as the United States, 
Japan, and India have resumed joint naval exercises. Australia has 
expressed desire to join the Quad if invited (Wroe and Garnaut, 
2015). Though the Quad members insist that the Quad is not a 
military bloc against China, but rather a strategic platform to 
develop a common thinking on shared security concerns in the 
Indo-Pacific region, China will nonetheless view the arrangement 
as a military pact designed to mitigate its attempts to dominate in 
the Indo-Pacific region.  
Independent of the U.S.-backed counter-balance strategy, the U.S. 
allies and partners are forming defence partnerships amongst 
themselves in order to maintain the stability in the Indo-Pacific 
region. This security framework is manifested in Australia‘s ties 
with Japan, India‘s deepening defence relationship with Japan, and 
the beginning of the Australia-India defence relationship. In its 
immediate neighbourhood, despite its complex relationship with 
Indonesia in the past (Brown, Frost & Sherlock, 195-96), there is a 




great potential for Australia and Indonesia to enhance their 
security ties.   
Australia can escape the reality in which Asia's rivalries drive 
broader global dynamics, which in turn will pose severe challenges 
for Australia's regional diplomacy (Griffiths and Wesley, 2010). For 
Australia a good option would be to shape a balance of power that 
accommodates China but also favours the region‘s democracies. 
But it will be difficult for Australia given China‘s increasing tilt 
towards authoritarianism. Australia, while continuing its alliance 
with US can engage with the democratic powers in maintaining the 
stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Australia can contribute to this 
by strengthening its strategic engagement with each of the Asian 
democracies, with priority given to India, Japan and Indonesia. 
This can be bilaterally as well as through stronger trilateral 
arrangements such as Australia-Japan-India, Australia-Indonesia-
Japan or Australia-US-Indonesia (Varghese, 2017).  
Protecting Australia‘s border integrity, deterring attacks on 
Australia, and protecting and promoting Australia‘s interests in a 
secured international environment, a range of bilateral, trilateral 
and quadrilateral security partnership which includes India and 
Japan as well become more viable in the coming years. As often 
emphasised in DWPs, Australia will also need to focus on 
developing a more self-reliant defence policy. But, Australia‘s 
alliance with the United States will continue to be relevant and 
more engaging on the security threat environment in the coming 
years. Australia relies on the United States for its security, but 
should the United States is put to a situation to confront Chinese 
aggression, the U.S.-Australia security alliance will be greatly 
tested. Australia‘s alliance with America provides a security 
guarantee from the world‘s most powerful military. Australia-US 
alliance is supported by the public, government and grounded in 
the strategic realities and the common values for the free and 
democratic world for which both Australia and the United States 
stand for.   
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